Johnson v. State Appellant\u27s Brief 1 Dckt. 41414 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-3-2014
Johnson v. State Appellant's Brief 1 Dckt. 41414
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Johnson v. State Appellant's Brief 1 Dckt. 41414" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4981.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4981
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 










District Court No. CV-2013-84 
(Gooding County) 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Robyn Fyffe 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho 
In and For the County of Gooding 
HONORABLE JOHN BUTLER 
District Judge 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
303 West Bannock 
Idaho Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
(208) 334-2400 
Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
II. Statement of the Case .................................................... 1 
A. Nature of the Case ................................................. 1 
B. General Course of Proceedings ....................................... 1 
1. Underlying criminal proceedings and initial post-conviction proceedings 
.......................................................... 1 
2. First successive post-conviction proceedings ...................... 1 
3. Second successive post-conviction relief proceedings ............... 4 
III. Issues Presented on Appeal ................................................ 5 
IV. Argument ............................................................. 6 
A. Prior Post-Conviction Counsel's Affirmative Misrepresentations and Mr. 
Johnson's Personal Efforts to Remedy Counsel's Deficiencies Provide Sufficient 
Reason Under LC.§ 19-4908 to Justify a Successive Post-Conviction Relief 
Petition .......................................................... 6 
B. This Case Must be Remanded Because the District Court Erred in Concluding 
That Mr. Johnson Had Not Produced Sufficient Evidence to Establish an Issue of 
Fact as to Whether His Successive Petition Was Filed Within a Reasonable Time 
and Counsel Was Not Permitted to Address Mr. Johnson's Other Claims ...... 8 
V. Conclusion ........................................................... 12 
I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) ................................................................................ 7 
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) .................................................................................... 7 
STATE CASES 
Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 924 P.2d 1225 (Ct. App. 1996) ................................................... 8 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007) .................................................... 8, 11 
Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 228 P.3d 998 (2010) ......................................................................... 6 
Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 992 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1999) .............................................. 8 
Mellinger v. State, 113 Idaho 31, 740 P.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1987) ................................................... 8 
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389,327 P.3d 365 (2014) ............................................................. 6, 7 
Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591,635 P.2d 955 (1981) .............................................................. 6 
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 215,220 P.3d 571 (2009) ................................................................ 6 
Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791,291 P.3d 474 (Ct. App. 2012) .................................................. 11 
Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 177 P.3d 400 (Ct. App. 2008) ................................................. 8 
State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 92 P.3d 521 (2004) ......................................................................... 6 
Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 36 P.3d 1278 (2001) .................................................................. 11 
STATE STATUTES 
LC. §19-4908 ...................................................................................................................... 5, 6, 8 
11 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the district court's judgment dismissing Mr. Robert Johnson's 
petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. 
B. General Course of Proceedings 
1. Underlying criminal proceedings and initial post-conviction proceedings 
In 1994, Mr. Johnson pied guilty to first degree felony murder after being informed by 
counsel that they could not prove his innocence and that he would be executed within five years 
unless he entered guilty pleas. CR 26-27, 52-55. Mr. Johnson's co-defendant Thomas Peterson, 
who bore sole responsibility for the murders, pied guilty to two counts of first-degree murder. 
CR 49-51, 217. The district court sentenced Mr. Johnson to a determinate life term. CR 217. 
Mr. Johnson filed an application for post-conviction relief, with the assistance of an inmate law-
clerk, which the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) employed at the time. CR 275-76. The 
court appointed the same attorney who had represented Mr. Peterson in the criminal case to 
represent Mr. Johnson in his post-conviction case. See 42, 102, 183. The petition was 
summarily dismissed because the allegations were conclusory and unsupported by admissible 
evidence. CR 186-190. The same attorney also represented Mr. Johnson on appeal and the 
dismissal was affirmed by the Idaho Court of Appeals on July 10, 1997. CR 183-190. 
2. First successive post-conviction proceedings 
On about March 10, 2009, Mr. Peterson handed Mr. Johnson a notarized confession 
taking sole responsibility for the murders and acknowledging that Mr. Johnson had acted under 
threat of bodily injury or death. CR 39-41. Mr. Peterson also informed Mr. Johnson that he had 
told the police, the prosecutor and his attorney (who also represented Mr. Johnson on post-
conviction) of Mr. Johnson's innocence. Id. 
The IDOC no longer utilized inmate law clerks and Mr. Johnson did not know how to 
utilize this new information. CR 275-78. He first contacted the prison paralegal to inquire on 
how to proceed. CR 277. While awaiting a response from the paralegal, on March 11, 2009, Mr. 
Johnson wrote his aunt seeking help finding an attorney. CR 56-62, 277. Mr. Johnson's aunt 
received his letter around the end of March and begin searching for attorneys. CR 56-57. In mid 
and late April, the aunt communicated with several attorneys, the Idaho State Bar and the 
Innocence Project. CR 56-57, 60-62. Mr. Johnson wrote each attorney and none responded. 
CR 277. The paralegal also responded by indicating he could not provide any advice as to what 
Mr. Johnson should do with the new information. Id. 
Finally, in May 2009, a lone attorney agreed to speak with Mr. Johnson and indicated he 
should file a successive post-conviction relief petition. CR 56-57, 277. Finally aware of the 
correct method to bring the new and exculpatory information before the court, Mr. Johnson 
requested a packet from the paralegal as soon as possible. CR 278. After waiting for the 
requested packet, Mr. Johnson completed it to the best of his ability, as quickly as he could. Id. 
Mr. Johnson next made an appointment as soon as one was available to make copies of the 
packet, obtain a notary and mail the completed paperwork. Id. Mr. Johnson took each of these 
actions "as soon as" he could but the "process still took weeks to complete." Id. 
On July 16, 2009, Mr. Johnson delivered his successive petition to prison officials for 
mailing. CR. 24. Counsel was appointed and, on August 27, 2009, counsel informed Mr. 
Johnson that he would begin the process to amend the post-conviction relief petition after 
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interviewing witnesses and obtaining Mr. Peterson's notarized statement. CR 17, 29. Mr. 
Johnson informed his attorney of his struggles in preparing and filing the successive petition. CR 
278. On August 14, 2009, counsel filed a motion to conduct discovery. CR 30-38. On 
September 3, 2009, Mr. Johnson returned authorization to release health information to allow 
counsel to obtain medical records to support Mr. Johnson's claims, provided information in 
response to the state's answer and asked counsel to provide further explanation of the affirmative 
defenses raised by the state. CR 17-18, 92-97. On October 19, 2009, counsel wrote Mr. Johnson 
indicating he would attempt to obtain affidavits from Mr. Peterson and prior defense counsel and 
that he "hope[ d] to file an amended petition and an affidavit from you shortly addressing the 
issues involved in your case." CR 18, 98. On November 17, 2009, counsel wrote in response to 
a letter from Mr. Johnson in which he acknowledged that the next court date was "looming." CR 
18, 99. Counsel indicated he would need an affidavit from Mr. Peterson as he drafted the 
amended petition and that he was in the process of drafting a motion to continue, so that there 
would be time to amend the petition and gather additional affidavits in opposition to the state's 
motion for summary dismissal. CR 18, 99. 
On November 25, 2009, counsel moved to continue the hearing on the state's motion for 
summary disposition scheduled for December 8, to which the state objected. CR 225. On 
December 1, 2009, counsel wrote Mr. Johnson enclosing an affidavit for his review and 
signature. CR 100. Counsel opined that he believed it would be clear error for the court to 
refuse to continue the hearing because it would deny Mr. Johnson of the opportunity to 
adequately present his claims. CR 18, 100. On December 8, 2009, the district court heard the 
state's motion to dismiss. CR 226. On December 17, 2009, counsel filed a post-hearing brief 
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and affidavits of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Peterson. Id. Counsel neither amended the petition nor 
presented any of the evidence establishing that Mr. Johnson filed his petition within a reasonable 
period following receipt of Mr. Peterson's confession. Id. On December 23, 2009, Mr. Johnson 
filed multiple documents prose in an effort to correct his attorney's shortcomings. CR 14, 226. 
On January 15, 2010, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Johnson's petition, both 
addressing the merits and finding that it was not filed within a reasonable time. CR 226. Mr. 
Johnson appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed solely on the basis that the district court 
correctly concluded that Mr. Johnson had not established that he filed his successive petition 
within a reasonable time following receipt of Mr. Peterson's confession. CR 217-221. 
3. Second successive post-conviction relief proceedings 
On February 14, 2013, Mr. Johnson filed the instant (second) successive petition for post-
conviction relief. CR 5. In addition to alleging the substantive claims surrounding Mr. 
Peterson's confession, Mr. Johnson provided additional evidence regarding the circumstances he 
encountered after receiving Mr. Peterson's confession. CR 5-163. After initially refusing to 
appoint counsel, the district court appointed counsel for the limited purpose of addressing the 
timeliness of the first successive application and whether further consideration of that issue was 
foreclosed by the doctrines of resjudicata or "law of the case." Order Re Appointment of 
Counsel. 1 
Counsel thereafter filed a memorandum and additional documents supporting that Mr. 
Johnson filed the successive petition within a reasonable time. CR 239-283. Counsel further 
1 This document was not included in the record on appeal and Mr. Johnson will request 
that it be augmented into the record. 
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asked that his appointment be expanded so that he could prepare and submit an amended petition 
supporting Mr. Johnson's substantive claims. CR 239-240. Mr. Johnson personally filed a 
supplemental response indicating he was uncertain if he was supposed to address the substantive 
claims on his own and that he lacked the ability and knowledge to do so.2 Mr. Johnson also 
urged the district court to expand counsel's appointment to the substantive, in addition to the 
procedural, aspects of the case. The district court thereafter summarily dismissed the petition, 
finding that the additional information regarding the challenges Mr. Johnson encountered in 
preparing the 2009 petition did not establish that the petition was filed within a reasonable time. 
CR 283-297. This appeal follows. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the prior post-conviction counsel's affirmative misrepresentations and Mr. 
Johnson's personal efforts to remedy counsel's deficiencies provide sufficient reason under LC. § 
19-4908 to justify a successive post-conviction relief petition? 
2. Must this case be remanded because the district court erred in concluding that Mr. 
Johnson had not produced sufficient evidence to establish an issue of fact as to whether his 
successive petition was filed within a reasonable time and the only issues counsel was permitted 
to address and that the district court considered concerned timeliness? 
2 This document was not included in the record on appeal and Mr. Johnson will ask that 
it be augmented into the record in a separate motion. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Prior Post-Conviction Counsel's Affirmative Misrepresentations and Mr. Johnson's 
Personal Efforts to Remedy Counsel's Deficiencies Provide Sufficient Reason Under 
I.C. § 19-4908 to Justify a Successive Post-Conviction Relief Petition 
When Mr. Johnson filed the instant successive petition, Idaho case law held that 
allegations of ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel could provide a sufficient 
reason to permit a successive post-conviction petition. Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 596, 
635 P.2d 955, 960 (1981). Accordingly, Mr. Johnson relied on that law in supporting his petition 
and the district court applied those standards in issuing its decision. However, in Murphy v. State, 
156 Idaho 389,327 P.3d 365 (2014), the Idaho Supreme Court overruled Palmer and held that 
"ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a sufficient reason under I.C. § 19-4908 
for allowing a successive petition. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 392,327 P.3d at 367. 
The question remains, however, as to the circumstances that give rise to "sufficient 
reason" - it is critical to acknowledge such reasons must exist lest the legislature's use of that 
language in the statute be rendered a nullity. See State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271,275, 92 P.3d 521, 
525 (2004) (it is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it 
a nullity). Further, even while holding there is no constitutional right to post-conviction relief 
counsel, our Supreme Court remains "cognizant that the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act 
is 'the exclusive means for challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence' other than by 
direct appeal." Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731,737,228 P.3d 998,1004 (2010) citing Rhoades v. 
State, 148 Idaho 215,217,220 P.3d 571, 573 (2009). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court 
has recognized that the status of an initial-review collateral proceeding as a prisoner's one and 
only appeal as to an ineffective assistance claim may justify an exception to the constitutional rule 
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that there is no right to counsel in collateral proceedings. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 
(2012); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
Here, the district court found that if post-conviction counsel failed to provide facts and 
admissible evidence establishing that Mr. Johnson filed the successive petition within a 
reasonable time, that failure would constitute "sufficient reason" justifying a successive petition. 
CR 289. Even if this finding is now called into doubt, Mr. Johnson's allegations concerning his 
representation in the past successive post-conviction relief proceedings went beyond simple 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Instead, Mr. Johnson alleged that his attorney continually led 
him to believe that the petition would be amended and then failed to amend the petition. Mr. 
Johnson also explained that he had informed counsel of the particular circumstances surrounding 
the time it took him to file the successive petition after receiving Mr. Peterson's confession and 
that he attempted to remedy the deficiencies in counsel's performance by presenting multiple pro 
se filings before the district court summarily dismissed the petition. 
Affirmative misrepresentations by counsel and Mr. Johnson's own efforts to remedy the 
situation give rise to sufficient reason in the post-Murphy world. Moreover, because Murphy had 
not been issued at the time this case was in the district court, Mr. Johnson relied on showing his 
prior counsel was ineffective. Thus, if this Court finds that the evidence presented is insufficient 
to establish an issue of fact as to whether Mr. Johnson has established sufficient reason, the case 
should be remanded to allow him to develop the claim in light of Murphy. 
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B. This Case Must be Remanded Because the District Court Erred in Concluding That 
Mr. Johnson Had Not Produced Sufficient Evidence to Establish an Issue of Fact as 
to Whether His Successive Petition Was Filed Within a Reasonable Time and 
Counsel Was Not Permitted to Address Mr. Johnson's Other Claims 
"If an initial post-conviction action was timely filed and has been concluded, an inmate 
may file a subsequent application outside of the one-year limitation period if 'the court finds a 
ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised 
in the original, supplemental, or amended application."' Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 
177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008), citing J.C. § 19-4908; see also Charboneau v. State, 144 
Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). The Idaho Court of Appeals explained: 
The legislature has seen fit to not include a limitation period contained in LC. § 
19-4908 and, as [the Court of Appeals has] previously held, the limitation period of 
LC. § 19-4902 is not renewed after the determination of an appeal in a 
post-conviction relief action. However, when a second or successive application is 
summarily dismissed because of the alleged ineffectiveness of the initial 
post-conviction counsel, application of the relation-back doctrine may be 
appropriate. Mellinger v. State, 113 Idaho 31, 740 P.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1987) 
(Burnett, J., concurring). This is so because failing to provide a post-conviction 
applicant with a meaningful opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be 
violative of due process. See Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381,385,924 P.2d 1225, 
1229 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. App. 1999). "The trial court's 
analysis of 'sufficient reason' permitting the filing of a successive petition must necessarily 
include an analysis of whether the claims being made were asserted within a reasonable period of 
time. In determining what a reasonable time is for filing a successive petition, [this Court] will 
simply consider it on a case-by-case basis, as has been done in capital cases." Charboneau, 144 
Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. 
Herc, Mr. Johnson was not initially aware that a successive post-conviction application 
8 
was an available remedy to bring the new information before the Court. However, he 
immediately took steps to discover what he should do by contacting the paralegal and his aunt. 
Finally, about two months later, an attorney informed Mr. Johnson that he could file a successive 
application for post-conviction relief. Mr. Johnson thereafter submitted the appropriate request to 
obtain the paperwork packet from the paralegal, filled out that paperwork and then submitted the 
appropriate paperwork to make an appointment to makes copies of the packet, get the documents 
notarized and mail them out. This process took weeks of waiting. CR 14. 
The district court found that these circumstances did not establish that the successive 
petition was filed in a reasonable time because Mr. Johnson "should have known" that a 
successive post-conviction relief petition was the correct forum to address the new information 
since he had filed a post-conviction action some fifteen years earlier. CR 292. The district court 
then noted Mr. Johnson did not provide any evidence showing that he took any steps to prepare or 
file a post-conviction packet between March 11 and May, 2009. CR 293. The district court also 
found that because he mentioned time-limits to his aunt, he must have had some knowledge about 
what he was supposed to do. 
The strict standard that the district court applied as to what Mr. Johnson should have 
reasonably known is in itself unreasonable. There is nothing unusual (or unreasonable) about the 
fact that an untrained inmate who had spent the past fifteen years in prison would not immediately 
perceive that he could file a successive post-conviction relief action with the new information. 
That Mr. Johnson filed a post-conviction relief petition in 1995 in no way indicates he would 
necessarily know that a "successive" petition would be available to him more than a decade later 
when he obtained new infonnation. Nor does Mr. Johnson's indication to his aunt that he needed 
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to move as quickly as possible in light of time limits suggest Mr. Johnson actually knew what type 
of action to file. Instead, the reference simply indicates he was aware time limits likely applied, 
not that he knew the correct cause of action. 
Even if Mr. Johnson "should have known" he could file a successive petition, he did not 
actually have that knowledge and immediately begin taking steps to discover the correct course to 
take. It would be profoundly unfair to preclude a petitioner from establishing a reasonable time 
because they did not already know what might be obvious to someone with the training and 
experience of a district judge. Moreover, the record reflects that Mr. Johnson acted diligently to 
protect his rights from the moment he received the confession. Using the mail system, several 
weeks transpired in communicating with various attorneys and his aunt. The evidence submitted 
by Mr. Johnson in support of this petition establishes that at no time did he sit on his rights and 
instead consistently did what he could to move the action forward. 
The district court also found that Mr. Johnson failed to establish that he filed the 
successive petition in a reasonable time because he did not note the precise dates in which he took 
certain actions. Instead, after the attorney informed Mr. Johnson he should file a successive post-
conviction relief petition, Mr. Johnson took each subsequent step as soon as he could. According 
to the district court, because Mr. Johnson did not identify the "date or month" he requested the 
post-conviction packet, the allegations are conclusory. CR 295. 
However, Mr. Johnson alleged that he contacted the paralegal "as soon as he could" after 
speaking with the attorney in May 2009 and that it took weeks to request the packet, complete it, 
to make an appointment at the resource center to finalize the packet and to wait for that 
appointment. CR 278. Mr. Johnson then submitted the petition for mailing on July 16, 2009. CR 
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24. Mr. Johnson did not know where to file the successive petition and thus inadvertently sent it 
to the prosecutor, who returned it and informed him of the correct address. CR 28. The petition 
was filed by the district court on July 29, 2009. CR 21. Mr. Johnson specified that took each 
action "as soon as [he] was able, however, the process still took weeks to complete." CR 278. 
It is thus apparent that the steps outlined by Mr. Johnson occurred between May and early 
July 2009. Given this context, the lack of additional precision regarding the exact date Mr. 
Johnson took each step does not render his allegations conclusory. While the district court may 
have preferred more detail or have believed Mr. Johnson should have taken exhaustive notes, Mr. 
Johnson certainly established issue of fact as to whether he acted diligently to protect his right to 
present the new information in a successive petition. 
Nor do the doctrines of resjudicata and law of the case preclude consideration of the 
timeliness in the second successive action. As acknowledged by the district court, those doctrines 
preclude further consideration of the same issue. CR 297, citing Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 
797,291 P.3d 474,480 (Ct. App. 2012) and Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,495, 36 P.3d 1278, 
1283 (2001). The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision that four months was not 
a reasonable amount of time based on the record before it, which provided no details as to the 
reasons it took Mr. Johnson four months to submit his successive petition. A reasonable time is 
determined "on a case-by-case basis." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. The 
question now before the Court is whether the additional information, which the attorney in the 
2009 successive action failed to provide, establishes that Mr. Johnson filed within a reasonable 
time. This issue was not addressed in the prior proceedings and its consideration is not precluded 
by resjudicata or the law of the case. 
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The district court erred in concluding that Mr. Johnson did not present an issue of fact as 
to whether he filed his successive petition within a reasonable time. Because counsel was 
appointed to assist Mr. Johnson solely on the issue of timeliness and that is the only issue 
addressed by the district court, this case must be remanded to allow for appointment of counsel 
and to present further evidence in support of Mr. Johnson's substantive claims. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Johnson respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's judgment dismissing 
his post-conviction claims and to remand this case for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this 3 day of September, 2014. 
, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3ay of September, 2014, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, 
Boise, ID 83720-0010. 
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